Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance (Updated November 25, 2003)

摘要

Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a long-standing objective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but replacing that regime with a stable, moderate, democratic political structure has run into substantial difficulty. Past U.S. efforts to change the regime failed because of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the efficiency and ruthlessness of Iraqs several overlapping security services. Previous U.S. Administrations had ruled out major U.S. military action to change Iraqs regime, believing such action would be risky and not necessarily justified by the level of Iraqs lack of compliance on WMD disarmament. In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Unionmessages, President Bush characterized Iraq as a grave potential threat to theUnited States because of its refusal to verifiably abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and the potential for it to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. In September 2002, the President told the U.N. General Assembly that unless Iraq fully disarmed in cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States would lead a coalition to achieve that disarmament militarily, making clear that this would include the ouster of Iraqs President Saddam Husseins regime. After a November 2002 - March 2003 round of U.N. inspections in which Iraqs cooperation was mixed, on March 19, 2003 the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm Iraq and change its regime. The regime fell on April 9, 2003. In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and reduction of support for terrorism; benefits such as liberation of the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime and promotion of stability and democracy throughout the Middle East. However, escalating resistance to the U.S.-led occupation has contributed to Administration implementation of several options, including attempts to recruit more foreign participation to post-war peacekeeping, building Iraqi institutions that can maintain security, and, as of November 2003, accelerating transfer of authority to Iraqi political bodies. Formerlyexiled opposition groups form the core of a U.S.-appointed 25-seat governing council as well as a 25-person cabinet; these bodies are relatively representative of Iraqs ethnic and political factions, but they have not established themselves as effective institutions. Congress has passed legislation (H.R. 3289, P.L. 108-106) that provides supplemental FY2004 funding for military costs and reconstruction in Iraq (and Afghanistan).