Case for a United Nations verification agency. Disarmament under effective international control. Working paper 26

摘要

It is now universally recognized that arms control treaties should be effectively verified. The most objective, flexible and cost-effective means to verify the majority of multilateral treaties would be through a new agency under the United Nations. As a cooperative international effort to develop both the technology and the political framework for arms control verification, a United Nations verification agency (UNVA) would speed up and help secure the disarmament process by: verifying a number of existing and future treaties; investigating alleged breaches of treaties; and certifying, upon request, that voluntary arms control and confidence-building measures have been carried out. This paper presents the case for such a proposal, outlines a possible institutional configuration, considers the possibilities for growth and discusses the challenges facing the establishment of such an agency. (author). 16 refs., 1 tab. (Atomindex citation 28:006227)