Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Korean War The Formative Period

摘要

The half decade following World War II represented an era of austerity,uncertainty, and tremendous challenge for the United States national command authority. Conditions and developments characteristic of these years were a severe reduction in armed forces capabilities; contentious issues dividing the military services; a near exclusive defense policy focus on Europe; a growing Soviet threat; an expectation that future war would be total war; and a general unpreparedness to execute a limited war marked by the non-use of full military capability. The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was about to undergo a dramatic transformation, as did that of the military under its control in the prosecution of battle campaigns with directed outcomes falling short of total victory. In June, 1950, the JCS faced a crisis of national proportion involving a country that did not initially enjoy the status of 'national security interest;' a heroic theater commander prone to challenge higher authority; and an overriding concern for avoiding actions tantamount to hostilities with the Soviet Union. Against this backdrop, the collective and individual performance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first six months of the Korean War represented an appropriate balance of professional military judgment and conduct under the condition of civilian control of the military.