Tactical Intelligence Staff (S-2) Operations in North Africa and the ETO and theCreation of the Military Intelligence Branch

摘要

This study investigates the slow improvement of U.S. Army tactical intelligenceoperations in North Africa and the ETO. During World War II, the Army improved its doctrine as it gained battlefield experience. Intelligence operations went against this pattern. After action reports mentioned the same problems with the performance of the S-2 sections. A 1943 after action report on S-2s in Tunisia sounded similar to a report issued in Germany in 1945. In the 193Os, doctrine writers, at Fort Leavenworth, developed an excellent intelligence doctrine. Yet, the performance of S-2s in combat never matched the soundness of their doctrine. Reports identified problems with training and techniques. Although the Army identified the problems and recommended the fixes, the problems remained. The exception to this trend was the Military Intelligence Service. This organization included linguists, order of battle, and photo interpreter teams. They shared with the S-2, EM 30-5 Combat Intelligence, the core manual of intelligence doctrine. The difference was the quality of training. The resolution of this issue occurred after the Korean War. This conflict and the World war II experience prompted the creation of the Army's Military Intelligence Branch.