Operational Art: An Analysis of Britain's Southwest Asia Campaign in World War I

摘要

Although there exist a wide variety of opinions on why Britain chose to commitassets to the Mediterranean and Mesopotamian regions, it is most probable that Britain viewed Russia's capitulation as a serious threat to the western front. It would severely affect the balance of power in the west, giving Germany the opportunity to break the stalemate that existed there. With this in mind, Britain launched four operations in the Southwest Asia theater (Egypt (Suez), Gallipoli, Arabia, and Mesopotamia) to relieve the pressure on the eastern front and to protect vital interests in the regions. Britain's concept of opening a southern front to threaten Germany was potentially sound. With successes in the south, it would have been possible for the allies to avoid the massive amounts of casualties that were resulting from the war of attrition on the western front. But the southwest Asian campaign was marred by disastrous results in major operations that did not serve, directly or indirectly, either the national or theater strategic objectives. Further analysis of operational art principles explains why Britain failed in this campaign and allows us to view an operational scheme that might better have served Britain and her allies.