Legacies, Assumptions, and Decisions: The Path to Hiroshima.

摘要

In 1995, the Smithsonian Institution's proposed exhibit of the Enola Gay on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the use of the atom bomb on Hiroshima created a furor. Veterans' groups and members of Congress decried the anti-American tone of the exhibit's accompanying commentary and its suggestion that the bomb was not needed to avoid a costly invasion of Japan. Revisionist historians opposed the 'cleansing' of history, called for a separation from emotionalism, and argued for the necessity of confronting the fundamental questions about Hiroshima. In the end, the Smithsonian removed the commentary. At root, these 'history wars' reflected a lack of national closure on questions about the use of the bomb. Revisionists contend that the use of the bomb can best be understood as an opening salvo in the post-war competition with the Soviet Union. Traditionalists continue to insist that the bomb was used to speed the end of the war and to avoid the certain heavy loss of U.S. lives that would have resulted from the planned invasion of the Japanese main islands. This paper attempts to step away from the emotionalism and examine the legacies, assumptions, and decisions that led to the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. It proceeds from the notion that such weighty national security decisions are rarely matters of either/or, but are more often the result of a complex interaction of personalities, bureaucracies, perceptions, and preferences.