United States Military Doctrine and the Conduct of Counter-Insurgency Operations: Fixing the Disconnect

摘要

Counter-insurgency operations have been and will remain part of the United States' foreign policy. In the past fifty years counter-insurgencies have been fought on every continent. As the world's sole 'super power' with a National Military Strategy of 'Shape, Respond and Prepare Now', direct involvement in counter-insurgency operations is very likely. Unfortunately, while there is ample proof that such operations will be part of the future, there is a lack of doctrine to guide successful preparation, planning and execution. To support the national strategy, doctrine is needed that will prepare the United States for success. The United States lacks a complete and coherent military doctrine for conducting counter-insurgency operations. As a result, leaders, planners and individual servicemen are not training for the full spectrum of tasks necessary to be successful. This is the case jointly and among our service branches. This paper will showcase historical examples and scholarly studies to identity what essentials should be addressed, and provide lessons learned upon which future counter-insurgency doctrine can be formed. Specific proposals will be made to reshape doctrine. The pitfalls of failing to collect deficiencies will be explained.