1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War: An Analysis Using the Principles of War.

摘要

The 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War provides the operational commander with an excellent opportunity to examine the importance of the application, or misapplication, of the principles of war in a conflict. This paper does not assert the principles of war as absolute truths that must be obeyed. It is intended to reinforce the validity of the principles as operational planning tools and that adherence to them will not necessarily guarantee success or that the misapplication of one or two will lead to an irrecoverable situation; but that the complete disregard for their concepts will almost certainly spell disaster. This paper will review the Middle East's prewar strategic setting, then briefly describe the air operation, the battles for the Sinai, the West Sank and the Golan Heights. Next, using the principles of war as a guide, the war will be analyzed from both the Israeli and Arab perspectives. The paper will conclude with some lessons learned from the conflict.