Applying Two-Sided Matching Processes to the United States Navy Enlisted Assignment Process

摘要

The existing Navy detailing process is characterized by bilateral negotiations between detailers and sailors. In this process, detailers match sailors with billets while attempting to satisfy, to the maximum extent possible, the needs and preferences of each group. The current process requires the effort of approximately 240 detailers and results in assignments that do not always satisfy the competing preferences of sailors and billets. This thesis explores various two-sided matching processes as currently used in some markets, as possible alternative means of assigning sailors. The similarities and differences between existing two-sided matching processes and the Navy's assignment process are examined. Various modifications to the assignment process and the matching algorithm are proposed to enable the matching algorithm to be suitably applied to the Navy's situation. It is found that the application of a two-sided matching process would significantly reduce the number of detailers required, while simultaneously improving the overall quality of assignments. Furthermore, to enhance the process, a means of including incentives to encourage sailors to accept difficult to fill positions is provided.