Operational Art Considerations for Army Air and Missile Defense: Lessons from the October War.

摘要

United States Army air and missile defense forces achieved tremendous operational success during Operation Iraqi Freedom. They also experienced tragic tactical failure with the fratricide of several coalition aircraft. These tactical failures may dominate lessoned learned from the conflict and conceal the significant operational considerations. The Operation Iraqi Freedom operational plan probably challenged many air and missile defender's conceptual models. Past experience and current air and missile defense doctrine promote force protection as the primary role of U.S. Army air and missile defense. Operations in Iraq pushed the air and missile defense system to give the joint force command freedom of action and force protection. This, undoubtedly, created cognitive tension within the air and missile defense community. This is good for the service and must be captured within air and missile defense doctrine. The purpose of this monograph is to determine whether or not Army air and missile defense planning and employment--air and missile defense design--has an operational art cognitive foundation. It combines the theory of operational art with a case study analysis of the 1973 Arab Israeli War and an assessment of current air and missile defense doctrine to answer this thesis question. Systems theory is the foundation of operational art. Therefore, the U.S. Army air and missile defense system merits are established first using complex adaptive systems evaluation criteria. An evaluation operational art theory and current joint and service operational doctrine establishes the operational art criteria. The operational design methodology provided within current joint and service doctrine forms the basis of these criteria. A case study of the 1973 Arab- Israeli War provides specific historical air and missile operational art lessons.