Unilateral Man Hunting: Is the Strategic Operating Environment Structured to Allow the Department of Defense to Conduct Unilateral Man-Hunting Operations

摘要

The Department of Defense changed its strategic focus after the tragedies of September 11, 2001. As the smoke and information cleared, a global campaign against the terrorist organizations that committed that horrific act was initiated, with the sole intent of bringing security back to the homeland. However, Cold War era policy and legislative structure reminded military leadership that unilateral operations are not easily accomplished under current legislative and policy guidance. Analysis shows that much of what is accepted as guidance comes through policy and historic precedence versus formal legislation. Using current U.S. law and Presidential Policy, this study attempts to dissect existing guidance regarding three primary areas that are required for mission success: access to intelligence, access to operating areas, and authority to conduct operations. The primary piece of guidance that is examined is the United States Constitution (USC), specifically Title 10, Armed Forces; Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse; and Title 50, War and National Defense. Other areas of the USC also are examined, specifically areas regarding law enforcement and intelligence (e.g., banks and banking, crimes and criminal behavior, food and drugs, and transportation.) Current legislation provides a framework for interagency cooperation while it establishes fire walls to limit the unilateral capability of any single element. The President, however, has the authority to clarify this legislation and shape the strategic environment for his subordinate elements through the use of Presidential Policy tools such as the Executive Order. (24 refs.).