China's Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance.

摘要

In a RAND study that I led which is currently under review, my colleagues Mark Burles, Michael Chase, and Kevin Pollpeter analyzed Chinese military doctrinal writings that discuss how to defeat a militarily superior adversary such as the United States, and found in them at least eight strategic principles that have implications for U.S. force posture in the Pacific theater. The first such principle is seizing the initiative early in a conflict. For example, Chinese military analysts note that, by not seizing the initiative in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq allowed the United States to build up its forces until it had overwhelming superiority. If China is to be victorious in a conflict with a militarily superior power, therefore, China must go on the offensive from the very beginning. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China, this means that U.S. force posture in Pacific theater will be critical, as China is likely to go on the offensive before additional forces can be brought into the theater. A second and related strategic principle for defeating a militarily superior adversary is the importance of surprise. Surprise is valuable not only for the immediate tactical advantage it conveys, but also because also because surprise is an important way of seizing the initiative in a conflict. Achieving surprise against an adversary will put the adversary in the position of reacting to China's moves, making it relatively easy to maintain the initiative thereafter. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China, this means that the ability of U.S. forces in the Pacific theater to avoid and survive surprise attacks will be critical.