Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem

摘要

Since the early 1990s, the United States has been concerned about the diversion of expertise and sensitive information from the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons complexes of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It has established a number of important programs to address the threat of NBC weapons proliferation. Several of these programs are managed by the Russian Transition Initiative (RTI) in the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. As part of its recent strategic planning process, RTI engaged the RAND Corporation to reassess the dangers that its programs are designed to curtail. This documented briefing offers a structured assessment of the threat of NBC weapons proliferation and examines each of its key components. It examines the countries and individuals that seek to illicitly acquire expertise and sensitive knowledge as well as the institutions and types of individuals who have them. Despite fears that such diversion might occur, the empirical record of documented incidents is comparatively small. Nevertheless, the diversion of even a small number of people or a limited amount of critical information can create a significant security concern for the international community. A key finding of this briefing is that the scope and the nature of the problem have changed considerably since the initiation of U.S. programs designed to reduce the risk of illicit diversion of expertise and sensitive information from FSU weapons complexes. While the situation in Russia and in the other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the FSU has changed, assessments of the potential problem of diversion of expertise and sensitive information have remained static and, as a consequence, are dated. This document also argues that the problem is larger in scope than just weapons scientists -- the RTI's programs also must focus on highly skilled technicians, retirees, and key administrative and support personnel who can provide key information.