Bottling Proliferation of the Uranium Genie: Identifying and Monitoring Clandestine Enrichment Programs

摘要

America must develop robust capabilities to identify and monitor clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Accurate and timely intelligence are essential elements in combating the spread of nuclear weapons, of which the President's 2006 'National Security Strategy' succinctly describes as 'the greatest threat to our national security.' This paper first delves into why the leadership of some countries desire nuclear weapons. A brief discussion of international agreements and American policies in relation to nuclear nonproliferation follows. Then, the uranium nuclear fuel cycle is described along with several pertinent case studies. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for American nonproliferation efforts are presented. An increased emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation within the United States government is required. Nonproliferation programs are spread across many agencies and departments within the Executive Branch, lending to inefficiencies and a lack of synergistic direction. Just as a cabinet post was recently created to enhance America's intelligence assessments, similar attention is warranted for America's nonproliferation endeavors. There are shortfalls in the intelligence capabilities of the United States to detect clandestine nuclear weapons programs, as was discovered following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. To remedy this deficiency, the United States must acquire the capability to accurately detect and monitor proliferators' nuclear weapons programs. Only by understanding what proliferators are doing can approaches be developed to stop or delay their efforts. There is a compelling case that Iran's uranium enrichment effort is not exclusively for nuclear energy, as they claim. Rather, Iran's objective is likely to develop nuclear weapons. Improved technologies to detect uranium enrichment could provide the key to finding the 'smoking gun' in Iran.