From the outset of the nuclear era it was recognised that an effective non-proliferation regime depends on maintaining effective control over sensitive nuclear technologies,i.e.uranium enrichment and reprocessing.Because these technologies can be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, their unconstrained spread,even for ostensibly civil purposes,would work against non-proliferation objectives–if nothing else,undermining confidence about states’future intentions. This paper focuses on uranium enrichment issues.In light of recent developments–including the discovery of an extensive black market in enrichment technology and,closely related,Iran’s pursuit of a uranium enrichment program–the need to limit the spread of enrichment capability is assuming increasing urgency.This presents both technical and political challenges. A number of proposals and initiatives have been advanced to address this issue.To date these have been aimed primarily at limiting,or proscribing,transfers of enrichment technology,or specialised components and materials.However,these approaches do not fully address other dimensions of the problem:illicit acquisition of enrichment technology,and development of indigenous enrichment technology.A way is needed to assess the international acceptability of enrichment projects regardless of whether they involve transfers of controlled items. A“one size fits all”approach to countering the spread of enrichment capability is unlikely to gain international acceptance.Rather,an approach is required that reflects a careful analysis of the issues and risk factors.This paper discusses relevant considerations.
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