CCIR for Complex and Uncertain Environments

摘要

This monograph examines the concept of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and determines if the doctrine is suitable for particularly complex operations, like counterinsurgency (COIN). CCIR was developed to accomplish three distinct purposes: (1) maintain situational understanding, (2) support decision points, and (3) manage information. A fourth purpose -- to support assessment -- is a relatively new addition. These purposes were all developed with conventional warfare in mind. Lessons learned from unconventional wars against insurgents or guerrillas were rarely applied to the concept of CCIR, and were systematically removed from doctrine when they did appear. However, Commanders involved in COIN have developed new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for creating and using CCIR. These TTPs often directly contradict existing doctrine and result in information requirements that fail to meet the criteria established for conventional warfare. These TTPs result from a doctrine that is ambiguous, confusing, and overly complex. CCIR can be considered to be part of an intuitive decision maker's response to uncertainty, and are highly suitable for use in a complex environment. However, their use is contingent on a clear and simple description of CCIR purposes, and an understanding of the difference between execution and adjustment decisions. Chapter 1 summarizes the Army's doctrine for CCIR, introduces key terms and concepts, and discusses relevant issues. Chapter 2 is a literature review that traces the historical development of CCIR in Army doctrine. Beginning shortly after World War I and going through doctrinal manuals published as recently as 2006, it examines the development of CCIR in three distinct periods. Chapter 3 addresses the use of CCIR in complex environments, particularly counterinsurgency operations. It also examines complexity theory and its implications for C2, intuitive decision making, and information overload.