Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: The Foundation and Implications of the New U.S. Doctrine

摘要

In December 2006, the U.S. Army published its new counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual (FM 3-24) FM 3-24 is the much-anticipated capstone doctrinal COIN guide for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Its intent is 'to fill a doctrinal gap,' for fighting COIN by delivering 'a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. The importance of developing a coherent, interdisciplinary approach that helps to fill the 'doctrinal' and capability gaps facing the U.S. military in the asymmetrical warfare spectrum, including COIN, cannot be overstated. In light of this, how well do the new guidelines in FM 3-24 for conducting a COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency. FM 3-24 outlines U.S. COIN doctrine in the form of strategies called Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs) With this in mind, are there cases in the Middle East where FM 3-24's LLOs have been applied and produced their intended effects. If they were not used and the state power's desired 'endstate' was achieved, what strategies were used to achieve the COIN campaign objectives. This thesis assesses the extent to which the field manual aligns with insights and practices from historical COIN campaigns in the Middle East as well as the new doctrine's ability to supply the United States with a COIN strategy that incorporates insights and conclusions from academia. Our findings indicate that FM 3-24 is a necessary step in developing an effective and coherent U.S. approach to COIN. However, it fails to incorporate some more contemporary social movement theory explanations into its strategies. For example, it fails to recognize the relative importance political inclusion in counterinsurgency strategies versus other variables, such as security, as a primary means of success in counterinsurgency campaigns.