Breaking the Code for Operational Planners: A Comparative Analysis of National Security Strategies Since the End of the Cold War; Master's thesis

摘要

In the post-Cold War era, as U.S. National Security Strategies (NSSs) have become increasingly focused on global affairs, the Presidents and their administrations have ascribed a vast array of grandiose modifiers to nearly every objective or goal in their reports. The lack of any apparent prioritization among the national interests and objectives has resulted in 19 years of political impreciseness, leaving operational planners to filter through a plethora of worldwide interests, goals, and objectives to identify the real priorities and interests that the President is likely to defend with U.S. military forces. This paper is a case study of every NSS set forth since the end of the Cold War, a period spanning the administrations of three U.S. Presidents. Through an analysis of these strategy reports, foundational documents, and the historical record of the use of the U.S. military, the author will assist operational planners by providing insights to help them identify what interests, values, or situations have warranted Presidential decisions to employ military force in the past, and are thereby likely indicators of future military employment. The paper first identifies the primary purpose, content, and audience of the NSS report through a careful study of U.S. legal documents. The author reviews the formulation of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which amended the National Security Act of 1947, and discusses the values, goals, and interests that he assembled from a focused look at the Constitution, its amendments, and the Declaration of Independence. The author then examines the NSSRs of the George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush presidencies, offers evidence of their unorganized approach to priorities, and provides a link between the strategies and the interests contained in the historical documents. The final part of the paper is a historical analysis of the use of the U.S. Military.