After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush; Monograph

摘要

This volume examines the manner in which U.S. policy toward postconflict reconstruction has been created and implemented and the effect that these processes have had on mission outcomes. The authors start with a review of the post World War II occupations of Germany and Japan. The end of the Cold War brought a second spate of such missions -- in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In the current decade, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have given rise to ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Presidential personality obviously influences the U.S. government's decision making process in terms of approaches to and the conduct of reconstruction efforts. Each president will have specific preferences for oral or written interactions, different appetites for detail, and varying tolerance for conflict among and with subordinates. In examining the eight cases addressed here, which cover three historical periods, they consider the personal styles of five U.S. presidents, the processes by which they made decisions, and the structures through which these were given effect. The resultant approaches to decision making are categorized by reference to certain archetypal modes, including the formalistic, the competitive, and the collegial. The first approach, often associated with Dwight D. Eisenhower, emphasizes order and hierarchy. The second, epitomized by Franklin D. Roosevelt, seeks wisdom through the clash of ideas among competing subordinates. The third, identified with George H. W. Bush, encourages greater cooperation among presidential advisers. As these examples suggest, all three models can yield excellent results. They can also produce quite unsatisfactory outcomes. This monograph examines successful and unsuccessful approaches to decision making in the field of nation-building, with a view to identifying those combinations of style, process, and structure that seem to have worked best.