Strategy to Dissuade China from Using Force or the Threat of Force to Influence Its Neighbors

摘要

This paper proposes a dual strategy to dissuade and/or deter China from using or threatening to use force to influence its neighbors. First, constructive engagement of regional partners is proposed to lessen the 'security and stability' operations burden on PACOM forces. Second, direct engagement with China is proposed to reduce tensions and reduce the possibility of misunderstanding the military actions by either nation. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) expanding economic and military influence in the Indian Ocean present both an opportunity and a reason for concern to the United States. With their energy demand increasing beyond internal supply capabilities, Chinese strategists view the Persian Gulf as the western extent of their 'strategic frontier,' and perceive the entire Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) connecting China and the Persian Gulf as a critical vulnerability. China might attempt to gain control of this SLOC as a result of a perceived U.S. threat. Conversely, a shared interest in these sea lanes could lead to increased U.S.- PRC cooperation. A peaceful and influential China would be an ideal partner for maintaining stability and economic growth, while a strong and belligerent China presents a danger to U.S. interests and those of its regional partners. Increasing the military capacity of friendly regional states can lead to a reduction in OPTEMPO of U.S. forces in the PACOM area of responsibility. This increases the number of PACOM forces available to respond to crises. It also may lead to a more formidable deterrent. Bilateral engagement with China reduces ambiguity concerning strategic intentions and prevents misinterpretation of military actions taken during crises. While engaging regional powers, including China, may create stability, any approach must consider U.S. strategic interests and the instruments of national power the United States will need to employ to safeguard its interests.