Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories

摘要

This article assumes that the government's response to an insurgency plays a predominant role in explaining insurgent success. It examines Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and observes when there are reductions in the frequency and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. This does not mean that factors other than the Israeli government's response have had no influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. In fact, the physical and political environment, the insurgency's level of organization and unity, and insurgents' strategies have also played a role. Still, 'of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response.' This study does not develop a comprehensive explanation for Palestinian insurgent strength, but merely identifies Israeli occupation policies that have coincided with COIN success and failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future research the explanation of why these associations exist.