Chinese Military Involvement in a Future Korean War

摘要

In late October 1950, with UN forces pushing north toward the Yalu River, Mao Zedong-influenced by the US Navy presence in the Taiwan Straits, Soviet heavy-handedness, and a somewhat altruistic desire to help his fellow Communist comrades-issued the order for China to enter the Korean War.1 His poorly equipped, parka-clad millions eventually stymied the advance, pushing UN forces below the 38th parallel and into the uneasy armistice that still exists. Until the very last moment, US war planners (and Gen Douglas MacArthur himself)2 ignored signs of Chinese preparations for attack-a strategic mistake which led to the hard-fought retreat of UN forces out of North Korea. Influenced by history, Korean analysts today often refer to the US fatal error when discussing future Chinese military involvement in a Korean conflict. This implies an almost fatalistic assumption that China would intervene on behalf of North Korea. By analyzing Chinese intentions simply through a historical perspective, we limit our conclusions to a prism of variables that may no longer be applicable in a post-Cold War era.