The General Equilibrium Model is Incomplete and not Adequate for the Reconciliation of Micro and Macroeconomic Theory.

摘要

The main thesis of this paper is that the competitive equilibrium model is the wrong model for the development of a satisfactory economic dynamics and the reconciliation of macro and micro economics. In particular, the general equilibrium model is essentially static, cannot handle information conditions with any ease, is basically nonmonetary, and also cannot be easily modified to handle mixed oligopolistic and competitive markets. In contrast, the noncooperative equilibrium solution of Cournot and Nash contains the competitive equilibrium as a special case and can be applied to economies with oligopolistic elements and nonsymmetric information. Furthermore, in the model building required to well define the noncooperative economy the stress is on process, money and financial institutions, inasmuch as they are needed to define the rules of the game and specify disequilibrium states. In contrast, the general equilibrium model is peculiarly unsuited to the handling of disequilibrium states. (Author)