Pareto Optimal Deterministic Models for Bid and Offer Auctions.

摘要

This paper generalizes the Barr-Shaftel auctioning model in several ways. It shows that the dual solutions they choose for prices and buyer surpluses is also the maximum buyer surplus solution. It shows that this solution can easily be found by means of a perturbation technique and relates the solution to core solutions of assignment market games, in the sense of Shapley and Shubik. It extends these models and theoretical results from an assignment to a transportation model. By adding seller reservation bids the symmetry of the auction process is increased in that it becomes pareto optimal for sellers as well as buyers. It proposes a fair bid auctioning process which has pareto optimality properties for both buyers and sellers, and which can be solved rapidly for problems having hundreds or thousands of buyers and sellers. Finally, it suggests that practical applications of these models to real auctioning situations is possible . Such applications could reduce the transaction cost and improve the speed of auction processes. (Author)