Issues Surrounding an Oil Import Premium

摘要

This paper presents a brief collection of thoughts on elements contributing to an optimal oil import premium. The authors have spent only a very small time on the subject. The principal purpose of this informal paper is to collect these few thoughts together for those able to invest more resources in the problem. We raise many issues, and solve few, if any. We provide what appears (after brief analysis) to be a useful conceptual approach for dealing with some of these issues, but we have not implemented any analysis, nor have we made any estimates to optimize 'The Import Premium' (TIP). We have identified a series of elements contributing to TIP. They include: (1) The United States has monopsony power in world markets because our marginal purchase decisions can be large enough to affect aggregate world demand for oil. (2) Reductions in U.S. demands for oil may improve our welfare on dimensions other than the oil market. (3) The oil market is not competitive on either side; it should probably be modeled as a bilateral oligopoly. (4) Trade in refined products requires that an import policy coordinate both the factor market (oil) and the final product market (products). (5) U.S. dependence on foreign oil sources increases the demand for U.S. military defense efforts. (6) Imposition of an oil import tariff may have macroeconomic consequences for the U.S. (7) The economic structure changes from the short run to the long run.