Korean Unification: A Game Theoretical and Bargaining Analysis

摘要

Since 1948 a stalemate has existed between North and South Korea on the issue of unification. Although discussions were held on the subject in 1972 and 1979, no substantive changes have occurred in the situation for 35 years. Thus, new approaches that could increase the possibility of agreement between North and South Korea must be developed. This thesis uses a game theoretical model based on the Prisoner's Dilemma to analyze the situation and provide strategy recommendations that can help alter the status quo. This theoretical model will provide policy-makers with an insight into the problems involved in moving towards unification. The role that the U.s., Japan, USSR, and the PRC have in the unification process is also analyzed using the game theoretical model. It concludes that: the time of act is now, the initiative for unification must come from inside Korea, and that a substantive increase in communication and cooperation are crucial if unification is to occur. Originator-supplied keywords include: Unification, Korea, Game theory, Bargaining theory, theoretical model, non-zero sum game, zero-sum game, integration theory, 2x2 matrix, matrix modification, Theses. (Author)