Stemming the Flow of Improvised Explosive Device Making Materials through Global Export Control Regimes.

摘要

The effects of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) continue to be felt throughout the world, especially on the battlefield. The United States currently leads the counter-IED effort through various demand-side efforts, such as those led by JIEDDO and Project Global Shield. The purpose of this thesis is to determine the feasibility of a new supply-side effort to counter IEDs through global export control that is similar to the multilateral export control regimes of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missile technologies. One of the contributions of the thesis is to classify the most prevalent and dangerous materials that have been used in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to create IEDs. To assess the feasibility of such an export control regime, the technologies in question will need to be classified as dual-use (i.e., material that has both a civilian use and a military use). The author focuses on materials that have played a significant role in terrorist bombing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The main components of these IEDS were ammonium nitrate, a nitrate-based fertilizer, and two electronic triggering mechanisms --the dual- tone multi-frequency board and the passive infrared sensor. A literature review of existing export control regimes provided information on their success and effectiveness. The thesis then measured these regimes against six variables: Dual-Use Relationship; Transparency within the Process of Regime Management; Threat of the Technology; Mobility of Technology Production; State Interest in the Regime, Relative to their Other Interests; and Capability for Capacity Building. Although IEDs continue to be a dangerous presence throughout the world, they lack the greater threat of WMD technology. The results show that IED technology and its component materials are difficult to classify and track, making global export control efforts extremely difficult.