Operational Readiness is the Issue: Unnecessary Friction the Detractor.

摘要

In the recent Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the biggest overall issue that contributed to friction for the operational commander was the across the board tendency of the component services to forget what was established and had been practiced, and re-invent the wheel. All services give a lot of lip service to the cliche 'fight the way you have practiced', but in the heat of crisis action planning for the Gulf War, we generally saw adlibbing instead of established and practiced responses. During Desert Shield and ultimately Desert Storm we saw how important it was for operational commanders to have plans ready to be refined and executed, but we also saw that friction can cloud even those perfectly refined plans. As the written record of the Iraqi War is created, there will be a plethora of lessons learned. Looking briefly at four areas that increased friction for operational commanders: the use of reserve forces; deployment/employment regulations and policies concerning females; dependent-related burdens that cost too much in both scarce fiscal resources and command attention; and complicated rules for dealing with allies with cultural, political, or religious differences, points to the need for changes in Department of Defense regulations and service policies. During this time of significant change in the military, we must reduce the self-imposed friction facing tomorrow's operational commanders.