Strategic Sealift: Funding during a Period of Force Austerity and FiscalConstraints

摘要

The world political, economic and military order is in a state of flux. The ColdWar is over. Bipolar spheres of influence are the trappings of the past. In August 1991 , President Bush outlined a new defense strategy based on four major elements: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. This policy is mandated by the new world order that will require the U.S. defense force to be smaller, CONUS based, mobile, as well as versatile and balanced. In essence, the force must be trained and ready. This readiness infers mobility with a capability for power projection to defend U.S. interests anywhere in the world. Strategic mobility demands we build and deploy a force that can fight on arrival and continue long term operations. The required surge and sustainment implies a strategic sealift capable of implementing this national defense strategy. However, the U.S. strategic sealift capability is on hard times. Ships are aging in both the commercial and military fleets, merchant mariners are becoming fewer and fewer and economic factors hamstring Congress and the Department of Defense for competing issues. To meet our need for sealift new innovative business practices must be entertained to fund the fleet with at least supplemental, if not sustaining, revenues for future operations. A form of trust fund, a straight sealift fund, that supplements Congressional appropriations and aids our merchant marine industry is necessary. Revenues from leasing, sales, scrapping, and international burden sharing can be cycled to stay within a fund rather than be returned to a general fund destined to be at the whims of competing projects. The government must get on track for strategic sealift in the force capability process.