Arab-Israeli War (4th): A Clausewitzian Victory for Egypt in Seventy-Three

摘要

The role that the military plays in the achievement of a nation's politicalobjectives through the limited, judicious use of force is examined through the analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. One again the Arabs, in particular Egypt found themselves in an untenable (No peace--No war) predicament with Israel, strategic and operational level deception plus operational level maneuver will be analyzed to highlight how, through their proper use, a lesser regarded opponent can start and conduct a short', limited, low risk war while achieving gains to the hundredth magnitude. Any country, but specifically Western countries, can learn much from this war. Western Democracies must learn that winning militarily is no longer enough. War, being just a portion of a nation's political will, must be acknowledged as only truly being won when won on the politcal level. From this, lessons learned range from the need to overcome the obsequious infirmity of human decision-making at the head of state level to great successes made possible through high speed operational level maneuver.