Soviet Manchurian Campaign: Decisive Victory over a Desperate Enemy.

摘要

On August 8, 1945, barely two days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Moments after the public announcement was made, Soviet forces launched simultaneous attacks against the Japanese in Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. By doing so, the Soviet Union fulfilled the secret terms of the Yalta agreement to enter the war against Japan within 3 months of Germany's surrender. This report compares the planning and execution of the Soviet Manchurian Campaign to the teachings of Sun Tzu, and, to a lesser extent, the indirect approach of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart. This document does not claim that the Soviets consciously practiced the principles of Sun Tzu or followed Hart exclusive of other theorists. However, by creating a template of the salient points of Hart and Sun Tzu over the Manchurian Campaign, theory and actual war appear to share convergent identities. Although not intended as a review of Japan's strategy in Manchuria, this report, to maintain balance, addresses the Kwantung Army's reactions to the Soviet buildup and invasion, and highlights significant Japanese failures. The Soviet Army's qualitative advantage in weapons and training and clear superiority in number of forces hardly invalidate the Manchurian Campaign as a remarkable example of decisive victory and the application of Sun Tzu in the 20th century. With few exceptions, the campaign emerges as Sun Tzu's kind of war, from the earliest stages of planning and diplomacy to the final defeat of the Kwantung Army without annihilation. However, this text also reveals the Manchurian Campaign as a possible aberration in 20th century warfare where the victor, had he a greater affinity for peace than he did for war, may have realized all his goals, as Sun Tzu recommended, without ever firing a shot in anger.