Cryptanalysis on the improved multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol based on the GHZ state

摘要

Recently, Liu et al (2011 Phys. Scr. 84045015) pointed out that the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol based on the GHZ state (Hwang et al 2011 Phys. Scr. 83045004) is insecure. They found that an inside participant can deduce half of the sender's secret information directly just by his piece of the secret. In order to resist this attack, an improvement was put forward. However, in this paper, we find that Liu et al's improved protocol is still insecure. We give details of three attack strategies to steal the secret information. It is shown that the eavesdropper can steal half or all of the secret information. Furthermore, a simple and ingenious MQSS protocol is proposed. We perform explicit cryptanalysis to prove that our improved protocol can resist the attacks from both the outside attackers and the inside participants, even the collusion attack.