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Absolute and relative power gains among state agencies in forest-related land use politics: The Ministry of Forestry and its competitors in the REDD plus Programme and the One Map Policy in Indonesia

机译:国家机构在与森林有关的土地使用政治中的绝对和相对权力获取:林业部及其竞争对手在REDD plus计划和印度尼西亚的“一幅图”政策中

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摘要

More than ever, state agencies responsible for forest issues are required to balance the social, economic and environmental demands on forests in domestic and international spheres. New and often crosscutting issues may threaten the position and power of traditional forest bureaucracies through, e.g., a redistribution of power among a number of other land-use-related state agencies. This paper analyzes the absolute and relative power of the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) in two selected policy processes originating on the international and domestic levels, namely the REDD+ Programme and the One Map Policy. Building on a behavioralist conception of power and bureaucratic politics theories, we study these processes to reveal the power dynamics between the MoF and other state bureaucracies, based mainly on documents on tasks assigned to these bureaucracies. Our results show a clear decline in the relative power of the MoF, most notably in the case of incentive and coercive power, though we also show a continuation of power resulting from dominant information. However, due to political intervention from the new president, traditional forest bureaucracy is now reclaiming most of relative power elements in these cases. We discuss the core findings and conclude that both REDD+ and the One Map Policy are likely to become effective policies only if the bureaucratic, sectoral and multi-level conflicts of interest we examine are addressed and fewer leading agencies (or one) assume responsibility for policy formulation and implementation. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:如今,比以往任何时候都更需要负责森林问题的国家机构来平衡国内外社会对森林的社会,经济和环境要求。新的,经常是贯穿各领域的问题可能会威胁到传统森林官僚机构的地位和权力,例如,在其他许多与土地使用有关的国家机构之间重新分配权力。本文分析了林业部(MoF)在国际和国内两级选定的两个政策过程中的绝对和相对权力,即REDD +计划和“一图政策”。基于行为主义权力观和官僚政治理论,我们主要基于分配给这些官僚机构的任务的文件,研究这些过程以揭示财政部与其他国家官僚机构之间​​的权力动态。我们的结果表明,财政部的相对权力明显下降,最明显的是在激励性和强制性权力的情况下,尽管我们也显示了由主导信息导致的权力的延续。但是,由于新总统的政治干预,传统的森林官僚机构现在正在收回这些情况下的大多数相对权力要素。我们讨论了核心发现,并得出结论,只有解决了我们研究的官僚,部门和多层次利益冲突并且更少的领导机构(或一个)承担政策责任,REDD +和“一图政策”才有可能成为有效的政策。制定和实施。 (C)2015 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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