Design and analysis of a chaotic maps-based three-party authenticated key agreement protocol

摘要

An authenticated key agreement protocol is a protocol for information security over insecure networks. Due to the excellent properties of chaotic system, chaos-related cryptography has received a certain development, and recently, researchers have presented some three-party authenticated key agreement protocols based on the chaotic maps. Unfortunately, most of the chaotic maps-based key agreement protocols use a password to achieve the key agreement, and this leads to some security loopholes. First, the server has to store a sensitive password table, and it would be dangerous if the server was compromised or the password table was leaked. Besides, the low-entropy passwords are vulnerable to some password-related attacks, such as insider attack and password guessing attacks. In this paper, we design a communication- and computation-efficient chaotic maps-based three-party authenticated key agreement protocol without password and clock synchronization, and formally analyze the security using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic. In addition to the formal analysis, we also prove that the presented protocol is free from most of the common attacks, and compare the performance and functionality with other related protocols. The result of the analysis and comparisons demonstrate that our protocol is more efficient and practical for real applications.