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Decentralization of natural resources management and improvement of rural livelihoods: empirical evidence from the Dimako Council Forest experiment in eastern Cameroon

机译:自然资源管理的权力下放和农村生计的改善:来自喀麦隆东部迪马科市政厅森林实验的经验证据

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摘要

Since the mid-1980s, throughout the world, decentralized experiments in natural resources management are being promoted under the major assumption that through the inclusion of those who were formerly excluded - rural communities and governments - themanagement of those resources as well as local and rural living conditions will be improved. In Cameroon, following the 1994 landmark Forest Law which transferred significant powers, resources and responsibilities to local actors, three primary modes ofinvolving local communities and rural governments in the forestry sector were created: community forests; the annual forestry fee (AFF) and (local) council forests. While the literature has focused on the governance of community forests and the AFF, thestudy of council forests has lagged behind until recently. This paper investigates the impact of the forest management decentralization on rural livelihoods in the local council of Dimako, the first local government to benefit from this particular typeof transfer of powers in Central Africa. Overall, the empirical data reveals that the whole experiment has turned awry as the benefits have essentially bypassed local villagers amidst stories of incomplete projects, overestimations and alleged misappropriation of funds by the local mayor.
机译:自1980年代中期以来,在世界范围内,自然资源管理中的去中心化实验正在以下主要假设下进行:通过纳入以前被排除在外的人(农村社区和政府),对这些资源以及地方和农村生活进行管理条件将得到改善。在喀麦隆,根据1994年具有里程碑意义的《森林法》,该法律将重要的权力,资源和责任移交给了地方行为者,从而建立了使林业界的地方社区和农村政府参与的三种主要模式:社区森林;年度林业费(AFF)和(地方)议会林。虽然文献集中在社区森林和AFF的治理上,但直到最近,议会森林的研究一直落后。本文在迪马科地方委员会调查了森林经营权下放对农村生计的影响,这是第一个从中非这种特殊的权力转移中受益的地方政府。总体而言,经验数据表明,由于项目未完成,高估和当地市长挪用资金的故事,收益基本上绕过了当地村民,因此整个实验都变得有些错误。

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