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An uncooperative order model for items with trade credit, inventory-dependent demand and limited displayed-shelf space

机译:具有贸易信用,依赖于库存的需求和有限的展示架空间的物品的不合作订单模型

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摘要

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain where a supplier sells a single product through a retailer, who faces an inventory-dependent demand. The supplier hopes to incentive the retailer to order more items by offering trade credit. The retailer places the ordered items on the display shelf (DS) with limited space and stocks the remaining items (if any) that exceed the shelf capacity in his/her backroom/warehouse (BW). From the supplier's perspective, we focus mainly on under which conditions the supplier should offer trade credit and how he/she should design such trade credit policy and corresponding ordering policy to obtain much more benefits. From the retailer's perspective, we discuss whether the retailer needs BW and exactly how many items need to be stocked in BW when the supplier offers trade credit. We formulate a "supplier-Stackelberg" game model, from which we obtain the conditions under which the presented simple trade credit policy not only increases the overall chain profit but also each member's profit. We also show that the trade credit policy is always more beneficial to the retailer than to the supplier if it is offered.
机译:本文考虑了两级供应链,其中供应商通过面对库存相关需求的零售商出售单一产品。供应商希望通过提供贸易信贷来激励零售商订购更多商品。零售商将订购的物品放在有限空间的展示架(DS)上,并在其后厅/仓库(BW)中存储超出货架容量的剩余物品(如果有)。从供应商的角度来看,我们主要侧重于供应商应在哪些条件下提供贸易信贷以及他/她应如何设计此类贸易信贷政策和相应的订购政策以获得更多收益。从零售商的角度,我们讨论了零售商是否需要BW,以及在供应商提供贸易信贷时确切需要在BW中存储多少物品。我们制定了一个“供应商-Stackelberg”博弈模型,从中我们获得了提出的简单贸易信贷政策不仅可以增加整个链条利润,而且可以增加每个成员的利润的条件。我们还表明,贸易信贷政策(如果提供)总是对零售商比对供应商更有利。

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