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首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Applied Engineering Research >An Efficient Approach To Allocating Service In Integrated Cellular Networks
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An Efficient Approach To Allocating Service In Integrated Cellular Networks

机译:集成蜂窝网络中一种高效的服务分配方法

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摘要

As far as Integrated Cellular networks are concerned, a significant issue that service providers are faced with is with regard to bandwidth (Resource or Service) allocations for different service classes when it pertains to the balancing profit and service quality simultaneously. The challenge increases when there a dynamic competition emanates between the service provider and its users. This paper attempts to addresses this issue coming up with a two-level game framework proposition. Based on the concept of replicator dynamics, the modeling of the underlying dynamic service selection is attempted on the basis of the evolutionary game theory. The modeling of any competition that could arise among various service providers is achieved by formulating an upper bandwidth allocation differential game. In this scenario, the upper differential game's state would be described based on the underlying evolutionary game distribution of service selection. The solution that results as a result of this linear state differential game is achieved by taking into consideration an open loop Nash equilibrium. As no information broadcasting is required, the model that has been proposed in this paper is in a position to be implemented with the communication cost that happens to be the least. It is also observed that by maximizing the social welfare component, it is possible to modify the selfish behavior that service providers demonstrate.
机译:就集成蜂窝网络而言,服务提供商面临的一个重要问题是,在同时兼顾利润和服务质量的同时,如何为不同服务类别分配带宽(资源或服务)。当服务提供商与其用户之间发生动态竞争时,挑战将加剧。本文试图通过两级游戏框架来解决这个问题。基于复制者动力学的概念,基于演化博弈论尝试对基础动态服务选择进行建模。各种服务提供商之间可能发生的任何竞争的建模都是通过制定上限带宽分配差分博弈来实现的。在这种情况下,将基于服务选择的基础演化游戏分布来描述上层差分游戏的状态。通过考虑开环纳什均衡,可以得出由于这种线性状态差分博弈而产生的解决方案。由于不需要信息广播,因此本文提出的模型可以以最小的通信成本实现。还观察到,通过最大化社会福利组成部分,可以改变服务提供者表现出的自私行为。

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