Pricing-based edge caching resource allocation in fog radio access networks

摘要

The edge caching resource allocation problem in Fog Radio Access Networks (F-RANs) is investigated. An incentive mechanism is introduced to motivate Content Providers (CPs) to participate in the resource allocation procedure. We formulate the interaction between the cloud server and the CPs as a Stackelberg game, where the cloud server sets nonuniform prices for the Fog Access Points (F-APs) while the CPs lease the F-APs for caching their most popular contents. Then, by exploiting the multiplier penalty function method, we transform the constrained optimization problem of the cloud server into an equivalent non-constrained one, which is further solved by using the simplex search method. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the Stackelberg game are analyzed theoretically. Furthermore, we propose a uniform pricing based resource allocation strategy by eliminating the competition among the CPs, and we also theoretically analyze the factors that affect the uniform pricing strategy of the cloud server. We also propose a global optimization-based resource allocation strategy by further eliminating the competition between the cloud server and the CPs. Simulation results are provided for quantifying the proposed strategies by showing their efficiency in pricing and resource allocation.