Market Dynamics and Systemic Violence: A Longitudinal Examination of Market Penetration, Entry Deterrence, and Excess Capacity in the Illicit Drug Market

摘要

The nexus between lethal violence in the drug market and drug-selling behavior remains a topic of interest among social scientists. Although the current body of literature demonstrates strong empirical evidence of systemic violence, questions still endure as to the underlying causal mechanisms responsible for this violence. This study uses 10 years of prosecution data aggregated at the county level to investigate whether drug-related homicide is predictive of first-time drug-selling offending. Results from a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis suggest that new entrants are using lethal violence to penetrate the illegal drug market. As drug-related homicides increase, the percent of first-time offenders being prosecuted for a drug-selling offense increases markedly. This relationship persists even after controlling for non-drug-related homicide. This finding suggests that lethal violence is being used primarily by new drug sellers, possibly to help them gain entry into a competitive drug market.