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首页> 外文期刊>Biotechnology Law Report >Hatch-Waxman Game-Playing from a Generic Manufacturer Perspective: From Ticlid~(R) to Pravachol~(R), Apotex Has Difficulty Telling Who's on First
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Hatch-Waxman Game-Playing from a Generic Manufacturer Perspective: From Ticlid~(R) to Pravachol~(R), Apotex Has Difficulty Telling Who's on First

机译:从通用制造商的角度来看哈奇-瓦克斯曼的游戏:从Ticlid(R)到Pravachol〜(R),Apotex很难确定谁是第一个

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摘要

SINCE THE INCEPTION of the Hatch-Waxman Act more than two decades ago, branded pharmaceutical companies and their generic competitors have battled each other constantly with a variety of legal game-playing strategies, seeking to wrest advantages fromthe complex and conflicting wording of the legislation. A more recent phenomenon is generic rivals using creative legal strategies to fight among themselves in court skirmishes over the highly valuable exclusive marketing period normally granted to the first company to file for approval to market a generic version of a branded drug. A recent decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has limited the scope for some of these inter-generic skirmishes and so restored some certainty to the process, but other attempts by generics to "game" the system through new legal strategies are surely inevitable.
机译:自从《哈奇-瓦克斯曼法案》(Hatch-Waxman Act)颁布以来,二十多年前,品牌制药公司及其非专利竞争者一直在通过各种合法的游戏策略相互竞争,力图从复杂而矛盾的法律措辞中夺取优势。最近出现的一种现象是,仿制药竞争者在通常有价值的独家营销期间(通常授予第一家申请批准销售品牌药品仿制药的公司)使用创造性的法律策略在法庭小战中相互竞争。哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院最近的一项决定,限制了这些跨种族小规模冲突的范围,因此恢复了这一过程的确定性,但非专利药的其他尝试则是通过新的法律策略“博弈”该系统肯定是不可避免的。

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