Hidden Anthropocentrism and the 'Benefit of the Doubt': Problems With the 'Origins' Approach to Moral Status

摘要

When considering the problem of moral status, many philosophers have argued that relevant capacities and interests, rather than species membership, ought to be the ground for determining who, or what sorts of creatures, should deserve moral consideration. In relation to nonhuman animals, this has often been expressed as requiring equal consideration for the interests to which morally relevant capacities give rise (see, e.g., DeGrazia 1996; Singer 1975), while in the context of human as well as nonhuman animals, species-independent accounts of personhood have been developed (e.g., Chan and Harris, 2012; Harris 1985; Tooley 1972). Although there remain some who insist that humans should be accorded specialmoral privilege qua humans, the strength of a non-speciesist approach to moral status is widely recognized.