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Quantum secure two-party computation for set intersection with rational players

机译:Quantum安全双方计算,用于设置与Rational Pressers的交叉点

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Recently, Shi et al. (Phys Rev A 92:022309, 2015) proposed quantum oblivious set member decision protocol where two legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob, play a game. Alice has a secret k, and Bob has a set {k(1), k(2), . . . k(n)}. The game is designed towards testing if the secret k is a member of the set possessed by Bob without revealing the identity of k. The output of the game will be either "Yes" (bit 1) or "No" (bit 0) and is generated at Bob's place. Bob does not know the identity of k, and Alice does not know any element of the set. In a subsequent work (Shi et al in Quant Inf Process 15:363-371, 2016), the authors proposed a quantum scheme for private set intersection (PSI) where the client (Alice) gets the intersected elements with the help of a server (Bob) and the server knows nothing. In the present draft, we extended the game to compute the intersection of two computationally indistinguishable sets X and Y possessed by Alice and Bob, respectively. We consider Alice and Bob as rational players, i.e. they are neither "good" nor "bad". They participate in the game towards maximizing their utilities. We prove that in this rational setting, the strategy profile ((cooperate, abort), (cooperate, abort)) is a strict Nash equilibrium. If ((cooperate, abort), (cooperate, abort)) is strict Nash, then fairness and correctness of the protocol are guaranteed.
机译:最近,Shi等人。 (PHOM REV A 92:022309,2015)拟议的量子令人沮丧的成员决定议定书,其中两个合法缔约方,即爱丽丝和鲍勃,玩游戏。 Alice有一个秘密k,鲍勃有一个集合{k(1),k(2),。 。 。 k(n)}。如果秘密k是鲍勃所拥有的集合的成员,则设计用于测试,而不揭示k的身份。游戏的输出将是“是”(位1)或“否”(位0),并在Bob的位置生成。鲍勃不知道K的身份,而Alice不知道该集合的任何元素。在随后的工作中(Shi等人在Qual INF进程15:363-371,2016)中,作者提出了一种私有设定交叉点(PSI)的量子方案,其中客户端(Alice)在服务器的帮助下获取交叉元素(鲍勃),服务器一无所知。在本选秀中,我们将游戏扩展到分别计算Alice和Bob所拥有的两个计算上的禁止区状X和Y的交叉点。我们认为爱丽丝和鲍勃为理性的球员,即他们既不是“好”也不是“坏”。他们参加了最大化他们的公用事业的游戏。我们证明,在这个合理的环境中,战略简介((合作,中止)(合作,中止))是严格的纳什均衡。如果((合作,中止),(合作,中止)是严格的纳什,那么议定书的公平和正确性得到保证。

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