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Moralizing gods, impartiality and religious parochialism across 15 societies

机译:跨15个社会的众神,公正性和宗教狭隘主义

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The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the evolutionary literature. One hypothesis points to culturally evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behaviour toward geographically distant coreligionists. Furthermore, another hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioural experiments and a set of interviews to a sample of 2228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, and wage labourers, practicing Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also forms of animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing predicted decreased local favouritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists (DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on out-group allocations revealed between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, moralizing gods may be implicated in cooperative behaviour toward outgroups. These results provide support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open questions about the treatment of religious outgroups.
机译:全新世期间大规模合作的出现仍然是进化文学中的核心问题。一个假设指出惩罚的文化进化的信仰,促进了对地理上遥远的加冕师的合作行为的促进。此外,另一个假设指向这些机制被限制在宗教植入,可能是以宗教小组为代价。为了测试这些假设,我们管理了两个行为实验和一系列采访,从15个不同人群的2228名参与者的样本。这些人口包括武器,牧民,园艺,以及工资劳动者,练习佛教,基督教和印度教,也是狂欢和祖先崇拜的形式。使用随机分配游戏(RAG)和独裁游戏(DG),其中个人在自己之间分配资金,地方和地理上遥远的共同宗教信仰和宗教小组,我们发现,作为监测和惩罚预测的局部偏袒降低了众多众多众多教会(rags)和与遥远的共同宗教信仰(DGS)增加资源共享。惩罚和监测众神对外汇划分的影响揭示了场地之间的变异性,这表明在没有互动敌对的情况下,可以对小组的合作行为涉及道德行为。这些结果提供了对监测和惩罚性众神的信念的假设,帮助扩大可持续社会互动的圈子,并开放有关宗教小组的处理的问题。

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