Complementarity in public and private intellectual property enforcement; implications for international standards

摘要

I examine the relationship between public enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights and firm strategies to influence entry of non-deceptive counterfeit products: illegal copies of authentic goods purchased consciously by consumers. I assume that private enforcement investment determines the probability that a counterfeit entrant will be detected, while public investment determines the efficacy of the legal institutions responsible for enforcing IP law. Private and public enforcement serve distinct complementary roles, which combine to determine total IP protection in the economy. I show that differences in the investment incentives of the two entities that control enforcement lead to inefficiently low public investment in equilibrium. In this context, international efforts to impose stricter legal penalties against counterfeiters can be counterproductive: further reducing public enforcement and increasing counterfeit prevalence. In contrast, minimum quality standards can be implemented to better align incentives, encourage higher public enforcement, and reduce inefficiency.