...
首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Hydrology >A fuzzy equilibrium strategy for sustainable water quality management in river-reservoir system
【24h】

A fuzzy equilibrium strategy for sustainable water quality management in river-reservoir system

机译:河流水库系统可持续水质管理模糊均衡策略

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Presence of various stakeholders in water resources management may arise conflicts and intensify the complexity of decision making. To reduce eutrophication potential in a river-reservoir system with discharges from aquaculture industries, an equilibrium strategy-based Multi-Pollutant Waste Load Allocation (MPWLA) program is developed. Proposed MPWLA model links a surrogate to CE-QUAL-W2 water quality model, with artificial neural networks setting, with an evolutionary optimization algorithm in an adaptive surrogate-based Simulation-Optimization framework. Environmental and economic objectives are formulated as fuzzy membership functions to deal with ambiguities and imprecisions in defining the goals of study. To consider the conflicting preferences of stakeholders, (i.e., Iran Department of Environment and aquaculture units), the Stackelberg game is applied and the results are compared with those of Nash Bargaining solution. Performance of the proposed approach is illustrated by its application to Behesht-Abad River-Reservoir system, Iran. Results indicate that application of the model may reduce the eutrophication potential in the Behesht-Abad water body by offering an equilibrium strategy. Comparing two decision-making approaches (Stackelberg and Nash Bargaining) also reveals that the leader in Stackelberg, as fine and constraint setter, benefits from the premier position, leading to higher environmental penalty tariffs, less fish production capacities, and consequently better water quality rather than the Nash bargaining solution.
机译:水资源管理中各种利益攸关方的存在可能会产生冲突,并加强决策的复杂性。为了降低从水产养殖行业排放的河流库系统中的富营养化潜力,开发了一种基于均衡的基于策略的多污染物废载荷分配(MPWLA)程序。提出的MPWLA模型将替代品与CE-Qual-W2水质模型联系起来,具有人工神经网络设置,具有基于自适应代理的仿真优化框架中的进化优化算法。环境和经济目标被制定为模糊会员职能,以应对定义学习目标的模糊和不精确。考虑利益攸关方的冲突偏好,(即伊朗环境和水产养殖单位),应用了Stackelberg游戏,并将结果与​​纳什议价解决方案进行比较。拟议方法的表现由其在伊朗参加Abad River-Choberoir系统的应用说明。结果表明,该模型的应用可以通过提供均衡策略来降低Behesht-Abad水体中的富营养化潜力。比较两种决策方法(Stackelberg和纳什议价)还揭示了Stackelberg的领导者,作为精细和约束制定者,从总理职位中受益,导致环境罚款更高,少的鱼类生产能力,因此更好的水质比纳什议价解决方案。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号