Multi-objective Stackelberg game model for water supply networks against interdictions with incomplete information

摘要

Highlights?A Stackelberg game model for defender against interdictions is formulated.?A nested genetic algorithm is designed for equilibrium analysis.?The impact of the incomplete information on equilibrium is discussed.AbstractWater supply networks are infrastructures pivotal to economic development and living standards, of which the increasing complexity and interdependencies have brought challenges for the protection and enhancement of water supplies. We address the problem on how to defend water supply networks with hydraulic characteristics against an interdictor by building a multi-objective Stackelberg game model with incomplete information. In this model, the defender and the interdictor, both considered as rational players, choose a subset of network components to defend or interdict based on their payoffs. The defender, with incomplete information on the interdictor's efforts, initiates to trade off the two objectives of maximizing the expected network satis