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Detection of Open Resolver Activity in DNS Query Traffic from Campus Network System

机译:校园网系统DNS查询流量中开放解析器活动的检测

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摘要

We statistically investigated the total A-resource record (RR) based DNS query request packet traffic from the campus network to the top domain DNS server in a university during January 1st to December 31st, 2014. The obtained results are: (1) we found significant query keyword based entropy changes in the total DNS query request traffic at February 5th, 2014. (2) In the total A-RR based DNS query request packet traffic, we observed 73-90% of unique query keywords including eleven source IP addresses (i.e. Kaminsky and/or Kaminsky-like attack). (3) Also, we found that the source IP addresses were assigned to the home/broadband routers in campus laboratories, as open DNS resolvers. (4) Also, we calculated frequency distribution of the Levenshtein distance between the DNS query keywords and the peaks that were observed at 10-15 per day. Therefore, we can conclude that the Levenshtein distance model is useful for developing a detection model of open DNS resolvers.
机译:我们对2014年1月1日至12月31日从校园网络到一所大学的顶级域DNS服务器的基于A资源记录(RR)的DNS查询请求数据包的总流量进行了统计调查。获得的结果是:(1)我们发现截至2014年2月5日,DNS查询请求的总流量中基于查询关键字的熵发生了显着变化。(2)在基于A-RR的DNS查询请求的总流量中,我们观察到73-90%的唯一查询关键字包括11个源IP地址(即卡明斯基和/或类似卡明斯基的攻击)。 (3)此外,我们发现源IP地址已分配给校园实验室中的家庭/宽带路由器,作为开放的DNS解析器。 (4)此外,我们计算了DNS查询关键字与每天10-15处观察到的峰值之间的Levenshtein距离的频率分布。因此,我们可以得出结论,Levenshtein距离模型对于开发开放DNS解析器的检测模型很有用。

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