首页> 外文期刊>Computer Modeling in Engineering & Sciences >Approximation of Unit-Hypercubic Infinite Noncooperative Game Via Dimension-Dependent Samplings and Reshaping the Player's Payoffs into Line Array for the Finite Game Simplification
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Approximation of Unit-Hypercubic Infinite Noncooperative Game Via Dimension-Dependent Samplings and Reshaping the Player's Payoffs into Line Array for the Finite Game Simplification

机译:通过尺寸相关采样逼近单位-超三次无限非合作游戏,并将玩家的收益重塑为线阵以简化游戏

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The problem of solving infinite noncooperative games approximately is considered. The game may either have solution or have no solution. The existing solution may be unknown as well. Therefore, an approach of obtaining the approximate solution of the infinite noncooperative game on the unit hypercube is suggested. The unit-hypercubic game isomorphism to compact infinite noncooperative games allows to disseminate the approximation approach on a pretty wide class of noncooperative games. The approximation intention is in converting the infinite game into a finite one, whose solution methods are easier rather than solving infinite games. The conversion starts with sampling the players' payoff functions. Each dimension of the player's pure strategies unit hypercube is sampled with its own sampling constant, being the number of equal-measure intervals between the selected points along the dimension. There are stated requirements for the sufficiently accurate sampling. Having got the finite game on hypercubic lattice after the sampling, every player's payoff multidimensional matrix is reshaped to reduce number of its dimensions down to the number of players. Dimensionality reduction will commonly accelerate computations, connected with the approximate solution consistency. The introduced consistency mechanism rejects the finite game solution, pretended to being the initial game approximate solution, if the solution depends vastly on the sampling steps. If the solution is weakly consistent then, changing the sampling steps minimally, there are non-decreasing difference of the players' payoffs and difference of the players' equilibrium strategies and cardinalities of their supports. If the solution is consistent then the non-decreasing property holds stricter for cardinalities of the supports and their upper densities.
机译:大约考虑解决无限的非合作博弈的问题。游戏可能有解决方案,也可能没有解决方案。现有解决方案也可能是未知的。因此,提出了一种在单位超立方体上获得无限非合作博弈的近似解的方法。单位-超三次博弈同构到紧凑的无限非合作博弈允许在非常广泛的一类非合作博弈上推广近似方法。近似意图是将无限博弈转换为有限博弈,其求解方法比求解无限博弈更容易。转换从采样玩家的收益功能开始。玩家的纯策略单位超立方体的每个维度都使用其自己的采样常数进行采样,采样常数是沿着维度选择的点之间的等距间隔数。对于充分准确的采样,有明确的要求。采样后在超立方晶格上得到了有限的博弈,每个玩家的收益多维矩阵都经过重塑,以将维数减少到玩家人数。降维通常会加快计算速度,并伴有近似的解决方案一致性。如果解决方案在很大程度上取决于采样步骤,则引入的一致性机制会拒绝假装为初始博弈近似解决方案的有限博弈解决方案。如果解决方案的一致性很弱,那么只需最小程度地改变采样步骤,参与者的收益就会不断减少,而参与者的均衡策略和支持基数也会有所不同。如果解决方案是一致的,则对于载体的基数及其上限密度,非递减性质将更加严格。

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