Prior sensitivity in theory testing: An apologia for the Bayes factor

摘要

A commonly voiced concern with the Bayes factor is that, unlike many other Bayesian and non-Bayesian quantitative measures of model evaluation, it is highly sensitive to the parameter prior. This paper argues that, when dealing with psychological models that are quantitatively instantiated theories, being sensitive to the prior is an attractive feature of a model evaluation measure. This assertion follows from the observation that in psychological models parameters are not completely unknown, but correspond to psychological variables about which theory often exists. This theory can be formally captured in the prior range and prior distribution of the parameters, indicating which parameter values are allowed, likely, unlikely and forbidden. Because the prior is a vehicle for expressing psychological theory, it should, like the model equation, be considered as an integral part of the model. It is argued that the combined practice of building models using informative priors, and evaluating models using prior sensitive measures advances knowledge.