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Rising Farm Wages in India—The 'Pull' and Tush' Factors

机译:印度农场工资的上涨-“拉”和“推”因素

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During the Eleventh Five year Plan (2007-2012), nominal farm wages in India increased by 17.5 per cent per annum (p.a), and real farm wages by 6.8 per cent p.a., registering the fastest growth since economic reforms began in 1991. Farming being labourintensive, this rapid increase in farm wages has raised cost of production of agri-commodities across the board. The farmers hold Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) scheme, started in 2006, responsible for this strong 'push' in farm wages and overall scarcity of farm labour. But farm labour is generally at the bottom of economic pyramid. Rising farm wages should be good news for poverty watchers, as it must have led to faster reduction of poverty than in any other Plan since 1991.These two, somewhat contrary feelings by the farming community and the policy makers, prompted us to look into what is happening to farm wages in India since 1990-1991. The special focus is on what factors could be really influencing farm wages and whatcan be done to contain rising labour costs in agriculture with a view to moderate the 'cost push' factor in food prices. It is interesting to note that the real farm wages increased by 3.7 per cent p.a. during 1990s compared to only 2.1 per cent p.a. during 2000s. So, if real wages had followed the same trend of 1990s in 2000s, the current level of real farm wages would have been higher than what it is today with MGNREGA. However, during the 2000s, there is a sort of v-shape behaviour in real farm wages, declining by 1.8 per cent p.a. during 2000-2001 to 2006-2007, and then rapidly rising by 6.8 per cent p.a. during 2007-2008 to 2011-2012, and it is this later half that seems to be the result of MGNREGA 'push' as well as strong growth 'pull'.This article captures the growth 'pull' factors through growth of overall GDP, or of construction-GDP or agri-GDP, while MGNREGA's 'push' factor is measured by the employment generated under the MGNREGA scheme. The econometric analysis is undertaken through a panel data set of 16 major states (by pooling) for the period 1990-1991 through 201 I -2012. Analysis is also undertaken for each of these 16 states separately through time series analysis for different time periods. The empirical results are interesting: that the growth 'pull' factors seem to have influenced more the rise in farm wages since 1990-1991 than the 'push' factor of MGNREGA. At all India level, the results reveal that a 10 per cent increase in lagged GSDP (overall), GSDP (agri) and GSDP (construction) leads to 2.4, 2.1 and 2.8 per cent increase in farm wage rates, respectively. This indicates that the growth in construction sector GDP has somewhat stronger influence on farm wages than the growth of overall GDP or even agri-GDP. Impact of MGNREGA is also significant but is 4 to 6 times less effective than growth variables since 1990-1991. Disaggregated analysis for each state shows that growth variables are highly significant in all the states while MGNREGA is significant in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. But again, the relative impact is much less. Overall, the results suggest that the 'pull strategy' works better than the 'push strategy' to raise farm wages over longer term.
机译:在“十一五”计划(2007-2012年)中,印度的名义农业工资每年增长17.5%,而实际农业工资每年增长6.8%,是1991年经济改革以来最快的增长。由于劳动密集型,农场工资的这种迅速增加全面提高了农产品生产成本。农民持有圣雄甘地全国农村就业保障法案(MGNREGA)计划,该计划始于2006年,其原因是农场工人工资的强劲增长和农场劳动力的总体稀缺。但是,农业劳动力通常处于经济金字塔的底层。农场工人的工资上涨对贫穷观察者来说应该是个好消息,因为它一定比1991年以来的任何其他计划更快地减少了贫困。这两种农业社区和政策制定者的想法有些相反,促使我们研究一下自1990年至1991年以来,印度的农业工资一直在上涨。特别关注的是哪些因素可能真正影响农业工资,以及可以采取哪些措施来抑制农业中的人工成本上涨,以缓和食品价格中的“成本推动”因素。有趣的是,实际农场的工资每年增加了3.7%。在1990年代,年均增长率仅为2.1%。在2000年代。因此,如果实际工资遵循2000年代1990年代的相同趋势,那么当前的实际农场工资水平将比MGNREGA的今天更高。但是,在2000年代,实际农场工资存在某种V型行为,年均下降1.8%。在2000-2001年至2006-2007年期间,随后每年迅速增长6.8%。在2007年至2008年至2011年至2012年期间,正是下半年的增长似乎是MGNREGA“推动”以及强劲的增长“拉动”的结果。本文通过总体GDP的增长来捕捉增长的“拉动”因素,或建筑业GDP或农业GDP的数据,而MGNREGA的“推动”因子则是根据MGNREGA计划产生的就业人数来衡量的。计量经济分析是通过1990-1991年至201 I -2012年期间16个主要州(通过合并)的面板数据集进行的。还可以通过针对不同时间段的时间序列分析分别对这16个状态中的每一个进行分析。实证结果很有趣:自1990-1991年以来,增长的“拉动”因素似乎比MGNREGA的“推挤”因素影响更大。在印度所有地区,结果表明,落后的GSDP(总体),GSDP(农业)和GSDP(建筑)分别增长10%,导致农业工资率分别提高2.4%,2.1%和2.8%。这表明建筑业GDP的增长对农业工资的影响要强于总GDP甚至农业GDP的增长。自1990-1991年以来,MGNREGA的影响也很显着,但效果却比增长变量低4至6倍。对每个州的分类分析显示,在所有州中,增长变量均非常显着,而在安得拉邦,阿萨姆邦,中央邦,旁遮普邦,拉贾斯坦邦,泰米尔纳德邦和西孟加拉邦,MGNREGA显着。但是同样,相对影响要小得多。总体而言,结果表明,“拉动战略”比“推挤战略”在长期提高农民工资方面效果更好。

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